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I. INTRODUCTION 
At its heart, the law of personal jurisdiction is simple and elegant.  
It is premised on two fundamental concepts that together establish the 
core of due process: connecting factors and reasonable expectations.1  
More specifically, to properly establish personal jurisdiction, connecting 
factors must link the defendant to the forum under circumstances that 
should invest the defendant with a reasonable expectation of being sued 
there. 
Yet, despite this simple elegance, the United States Supreme Court 
has proven incapable of providing a coherent vision of the law of 
personal jurisdiction.  In essence, the Court’s fact-specific, case-by-case 
approach has produced an ever-widening doctrinal morass.  As a 
consequence, the fundamental principles have been submerged beneath 
mechanistic formulas that are both too broad and too narrow and that, all 
too often, are open to subjective interpretations and applications.  
Moreover, the various “tests” are sometimes redundant in that they 
endorse alternative case-specific formulas that could easily be reduced to 
one test. 
After carefully considering and critiquing the current body of 
1.  In my view, the due process standards of personal jurisdiction are not the proper vehicle
through which to address questions of sovereignty or state power.  Due process pertains to liberty, 
not to sovereignty.  The sole constitutional issue in that context is whether a state could rationally 
conclude that the exercise of jurisdiction over a particular set of facts might rationally advance its 
interest in the protection of the health, safety, or welfare of its constituents.  The sovereignty and 
liberty questions may be related, but they are not the same.  In fact, the Court has made it clear that 
there was no independent sovereignty analysis in the determination of whether personal jurisdiction 
would be consistent with due process.  See Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do 
with It?  Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729 (2012). 
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jurisdictional doctrine, this Article suggests a return to fundamental 
principles.2  To that end, I propose that the law of personal jurisdiction 
be codified in a statute that says more than “conform to due process” but 
does not resemble a highly formalistic, tailored long-arm statute. 
Rather, my proposed statute defines due process in a manner that 
captures the essence of personal jurisdiction at a principled level, 
providing a durable standard capable of application across a wide range 
of cases.  Thus, the statute avoids the “mechanistic and ‘transcendental 
nonsense’ of legal formalism,”3 while offering effective guidance to the 
courts that would apply the statute.  As such, the statute invites results 
that are premised on “predictable and nonsubjective conclusions.”4 
Of course, all statutes are subject to judicial interpretation and the 
power of judicial review.  That combination puts any statutory text at 
risk.  Hence, my goal is not simply to propose a model statute but also to 
lay the foundation for a different way of thinking about the law of 
personal jurisdiction.  In other words, my goal is to turn the Supreme 
Court back to the fundamental principles of due process. 
The dominant academic view of the Supreme Court’s personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence is that it constitutes a body of decisions that 
have progressively fined-tuned the relevant doctrine through a self-
correcting process of trial and error.5  Scholarship tends to work around 
the edges of this process.  Thus, there is a body of literature that attempts 
to organize the developed doctrine into useful subcategories;6 another 
2.  For a discussion of my theoretical approach to procedure, see Simona Grossi, A Modified
Theory of the Law of Federal Courts: The Case of Arising-Under Jurisdiction, 88 WASH. L. REV. 
961 (2013). 
3.  Robert Post, Theorizing Disagreement, Reconceiving the Relationship Between Law and
Politics, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (2010). 
4.  Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1085, 1090 (1995). 
5.  See, e.g., 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1067.1 (3d. ed. 2013) (offering a positive narrative of the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 133-46 (4th ed. 1999) (describing the Court’s refinement of the International Shoe 
standard) (hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE).  But see Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the 
Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. REV. 753 (2003) (arguing for the abandonment of 
the International Shoe minimum contacts test). 
6.  See, e.g., Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136-53 (1966) (drawing a distinction between general 
and specific jurisdiction); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
610 (1988) (endorsing a more careful consideration of the distinction between general and specific 
jurisdiction); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It’s Not General Jurisdiction, 
or Specific Jurisdiction, But Is It Constitutional?, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559 (1998) (noting the 
emergence of a form of jurisdiction that is a “hybrid” of the general and specific categories).  See 
also Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999 
(2012) (assessing the current status of general jurisdiction). 
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that argues in favor of or against various doctrinal developments;7 and 
still another that focuses its attention on potential novel applications of 
established doctrine to emerging economic and social trends.8  This 
scholarly endeavor is valuable indeed, in that it contributes to a better 
understanding of the courts’ overall approach to the law of personal 
jurisdiction, thereby giving guidance to the legal profession and the 
scholarly community.  I do something different.  My goal is not to 
categorize, critique, or refine existing doctrine, but to challenge the idea 
that the Supreme Court’s case-by-case approach to personal jurisdiction 
represents an arc of progress.  In my view, all too often the Court’s 
apparent refinements operate as detours from the fundamental principles 
at stake.  The result is a clutter of doctrinal tests that is inconsistent with 
principle and confuses more than it informs. 
In Part II, I briefly explore the traditional bases of jurisdiction and 
the Court’s elaboration of the minimum contacts test in International 
Shoe Co. v. State of Washington.9  Here, I show that both the traditional 
and minimum contacts approaches are premised largely on the existence 
of connecting factors and reasonable expectations.  In short, each form 
operates (with one exception) from the perspective of fundamental 
principles unadorned by doctrinal explication.  Part III shows how the 
Court’s post-International Shoe jurisprudence has elevated fact-driven 
and case-specific doctrine over the underlying fundamental principles.  
This phenomenon is particularly apparent with respect to the purposeful 
availment requirement and with the standards applied to the stream-of-
commerce and effects tests.  Here, I also examine some of the resulting 
confusion in lower courts.  Part IV offers and defends a model statute 
that is designed to return personal jurisdiction to a fundamental-
7.  See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 IOWA L. REV.
1163 (2013) (critique on the current direction of doctrinal development); Allan Ides, A Critical 
Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 341 (2012) (critique of the Court’s stream of commerce decisions); Robin J. Effron, 
Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness Problem in Personal 
Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867 (2012) (same); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of 
Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2010) (criticizing the Court for its lack of 
guidance as to the timeframe within which minimum contacts should be analyzed); Mona A. Lee, 
Burger King’s Bifurcated Test for Personal Jurisdiction: The Reasonableness Inquiry Impedes 
Judicial Economy and Threatens a Defendant’s Due Process Rights, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 945 (1993). 
8.  See, e.g., Sarah H. Ludington, Aiming at the Wrong Target: The “Audience Targeting”
Test for Personal Jurisdiction in Internet Defamation Cases, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 541 (2012); Megan 
M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 43 (2010); Veronica M. Sanchez, Taking a Byte Out of Minimum Contacts: A Reasonable 
Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Trademark Disputes, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1671 
(1999). 
9.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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principles approach shorn of restrictive and redundant doctrine.  Part V 
offers concluding remarks. 
II. JURISDICTION PREMISED ON CONNECTING FACTORS AND
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
The standards of personal jurisdiction have been shaped primarily 
by decisions of the Supreme Court.10  Those decisions recognize two 
broad categories of circumstances under which jurisdiction may be 
exercised consistently with due process.  The first category includes 
those exercises of jurisdiction that can be described as traditional, 
tracing their origins to at least the late nineteenth century.  The second 
category includes those exercises of jurisdiction that fall within the 
general contours of the “minimum contacts” test. 
A. The Traditional Category 
The traditional bases of personal jurisdiction include domicile, 
voluntary appearance, consent to service of process, and physical 
presence.  Each of these forms is consistent with the sovereignty 
principle announced in Pennoyer v. Neff.11  There, the Court saw due 
process as reflecting a principle of “territoriality” under which a state 
had complete jurisdictional dominion within its territory but virtually 
none beyond its borders (with some exceptions).12  When jurisdiction is 
asserted on one of these traditional bases—that were widely recognized 
at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868—it 
categorically satisfies due process.13 
Territoriality aside, another way to describe the traditional bases is 
as a reflection of connecting factors and expectations that make the 
exercise of jurisdiction reasonable (and hence consistent with due 
process).  The fit is not perfect, as we will see, but the parallels are 
significant.  Thus, one’s status as a domiciliary can be seen as a 
connecting factor that creates a reasonable expectation of being subject 
to suit within the state of domicile given the tangible and intangible 
benefits that flow from citizenship.  Essentially, a domiciliary has 
consented to the jurisdictional authority of the state in which he is 
10.  See generally ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND 
PROCEDURE 53-200 (4th ed. 2012); Friedrich K. Juenger, American Jurisdiction: A Story of 
Comparative Neglect, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2-17 (1993). 
11.  Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
12.  Id. at 722.
13. IDES & MAY, supra note 10, at 66-76.
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domiciled.  Similarly, a person who has voluntarily appeared in court or 
contractually consented to jurisdiction within the forum has, by so 
acting, created a connecting factor that leads inexorably to a reasonable 
expectation of forum-based jurisdiction. 
The fit is not quite as comfortable with respect to persons or 
property found within the forum.  Although this form of jurisdiction is 
premised on a rather obvious geographic connection with the forum, it is 
not equally obvious that the connection universally creates (or ought to 
be seen as creating) a reasonable expectation of jurisdiction within the 
forum.14  One could argue that physical presence in the forum creates an 
expectation of jurisdiction based on Pennoyer’s territoriality principle.  
But that is a circular argument in which due process is dependent on a 
legal abstraction.  Certainly, an expectation of jurisdiction is not an 
inherent characteristic of one’s temporary presence within the territory 
(or from the fact that property is temporarily located within the 
jurisdiction).  The “reasonableness” of any such expectation might well 
depend on the nature of the presence and the relationship between that 
presence and the claim asserted. 
In sum, certain traditional forms of jurisdiction, although based on a 
sovereignty principle, can be seen as reflective of the due process 
principles of connecting factors and reasonable expectations.  Domicile, 
voluntary appearance, and consent all fall into this category.  On the 
other hand, the category of persons or property found within the 
jurisdiction, at least when applied rigidly, may be inconsistent with the 
reasonable expectation principle. 
B. Tradition Extended—Minimum Contacts 
Whenever a defendant is sued in a place other than his domicile and 
whenever jurisdiction cannot be established on some other traditional 
bases, due process requires that there must be some indication that the 
defendant was otherwise on reasonable notice of the possibility of being 
sued there.  Reasonable notice can be established either because he 
performed activities in that state or because his contacts with the state 
are such that the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of that state does not 
come as an unfair surprise to him.  More specifically, in International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington,15 the Supreme Court held that “due process 
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in 
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have 
14.  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1977).
15.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.’”16 
While International Shoe did not overrule Pennoyer, it did adopt a 
model of due process that is premised less on sovereignty than it is on 
the connecting factors that make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.  
To state the matter very generally, under the minimum contacts test, 
states would be allowed to reach out beyond their territorial limits when 
connecting factors make it fair and reasonable to do so.  Thus, under the 
minimum contacts test, a nonresident defendant must have directed her 
conduct toward the forum state, for example, by engaging in activities 
there,17 entering into contracts with residents of the forum state,18 
marketing or selling a dangerous or defective product there,19 or causing 
an effect there.20  In addition, the activities or contacts with the state 
must be related to the claim (specific jurisdiction)21 or be so 
“continuous, substantial and systematic” that it is as if the nonresident 
defendant were “at home” there (general jurisdiction).22  If these 
standards are satisfied, the exercise of jurisdiction is presumed to be 
reasonable, i.e., it is consistent with due process.  A nonresident 
defendant may, however, rebut that presumption by a strong showing to 
the contrary.23 
16.  Id. at 316 (second emphasis added) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)). 
17.  Id. at 317.
18.  See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985). 
19.  See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 
(1980). 
20.  See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
21.  See Nowak v. Tak How Inv. Ltd., 899 F. Supp. 25, 28 (D. Mass. 1995).
22.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. 
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1952).  One can see general jurisdiction as an extension of the 
traditional basis of jurisdiction premised on domicile.  In essence, the principle that jurisdiction is 
proper in the place of the defendant’s domicile is expanded to say that, even when individuals or 
corporations are not formally “domiciled” in a state, if their activity there is continuous, substantial, 
and systematic, they may still be treated as if they were domiciled in that state, and the court may 
exercise general jurisdiction over them.  Doing extensive activity in the forum state, however, is not 
considered a traditional basis of personal jurisdiction that, as such, does not require any fact-specific 
scrutiny to establish its consistency with due process and, therefore, its validity.  A fact-specific 
analysis will always be required to find that, indeed, the activity done in the forum state is extensive 
and, by its very nature, a contact that should put the defendant on notice of the possibility of being 
haled into court there on any cause of action. 
23.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115-16; Nowak, 899 F. Supp. at 33.  In Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134
S.Ct. 746, 762 n.19 (2014), a majority of the Court ruled that the “second step” reasonableness 
inquiry is superfluous in once the standards for general jurisdiction have been satisfied. 
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We can see then that both the traditional bases for asserting 
jurisdiction and the minimum contacts test share a salient characteristic 
in common—namely, they are both based on connecting factors that 
give rise to a reasonable expectation of being sued in the forum. 
***** 
Since the decision in International Shoe, which focused more on 
fundamental principles than it did on the niceties of doctrine, the 
Supreme Court has gradually but steadily moved toward a technical and 
specialized approach to the law of personal jurisdiction,24, such that we 
can now think in terms of categories and subcategories of problems: 
activities in the forum, contracts with forum residents, tortious effects in 
the state, products liability cases, internet cases and so forth.  To put it 
differently, the Court in International Shoe endorsed fundamental 
principles discovered in the case law from a somewhat removed 
perspective, and it described those fundamental principles in broad and 
nontechnical terms.  Since International Shoe, however, the Court has 
moved from the fundamental principles approach to a form of line 
drawing that one might expect to find in an ever-morphing code.  As will 
be discussed below, rather than serving the fundamental principles of 
due process, this fragmented, piecemeal discipline has often resulted in a 
disservice of the basic principles it sought to further. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH TO PERSONAL
JURISDICTION 
A. The Ascendance of Doctrine 
What came in the wake of International Shoe was a process of 
redirecting the fundamental principles approach into more specific 
doctrinal categories.  Some of that process has been informative as to the 
basic reach of the model, and respectful of its fundamental principles.  
Other parts of the redirecting process, however, seem to have elevated 
doctrine over those principles, or at least have insinuated doctrine 
between the fundamental principles and the facts. 
1. Fundamental Principles Adrift: McGee and Hansen
In its October 1957 term, the Supreme Court decided two personal 
24.  See IDES & MAY, supra note 10, at 90-150 (providing the opinions of major cases
discussed in this paper and a short commentary on how the Court’s opinions have changed from 
case to case). 
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jurisdiction cases, one of which might be characterized as informative 
but unnecessary, while the other may have begun the drift away from the 
fundamental-principles approach established in International Shoe.  The 
first, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,25 involved a suit to 
enforce the provisions of a life insurance policy.  The facts were simple.  
An insurance company from Texas solicited a reinsurance agreement 
with a resident of California via mail.  The offer was accepted in 
California, and the insurance premiums were mailed from California to 
Texas, until the insured died.  His mother, the beneficiary under the 
policy, filed a claim with the insurance company, but the company 
refused to pay.  She then sued the company in a California state court, 
which upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the insurance 
company and eventually entered a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor.  
When the mother sought to enforce that judgment in Texas, however, 
Texas courts refused to give it full faith and credit on the theory that the 
California courts lacked jurisdiction over the Texas company.26 
The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether a single 
contact with the forum—the solicitation of one policy—could serve as a 
proper basis on which to exercise personal jurisdiction.27  In fact, the 
Court in International Shoe had already given this question an 
affirmative response when it observed that a single act could be “deemed 
sufficient” to establish jurisdiction depending on the “nature and quality 
and the circumstances of [its] commission.”28  With that principle having 
been established, there was little more the Supreme Court needed to say 
about it.  In upholding the California courts’ exercise of personal 
jurisdiction, the Court explained, “[W]e think it apparent that the Due 
Process Clause did not preclude the California court from entering a 
judgment binding on respondent.  It is sufficient for purposes of due 
process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial 
connection with that State.”29 
In so ruling, the McGee Court did no more than conform its 
judgment to the fundamentals of due process announced in International 
Shoe.  The essence of the ruling was that the insurance company’s 
solicitation of a contract in California established a connecting factor 
with that state and created a reasonable expectation in the insurance 
25.  McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
26.  Id. at 221.
27.  Id. at 223.
28.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (citing Kane v. New
Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927)). 
29.  McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. 
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company that it might be sued in California for breach of that contract. 
Thus, the Court’s decision did not articulate any new doctrine.  Rather, it 
policed the application of established principles and reiterated them for 
the guidance of lower courts.  One might criticize the Court for being too 
engaged in correcting case-specific errors, but one could also say that its 
opinion served as a useful reminder of the fundamental principles 
established twelve years earlier in International Shoe. 
Six months after the decision in McGee, the Court returned to 
personal jurisdiction in Hanson v. Denckla30 to specify that a plaintiff’s 
unilateral contacts with the forum are not relevant for purposes of 
establishing personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.  But was 
that really necessary?  And was that actually the issue presented to the 
Court?  As to the first question, the Court in International Shoe had 
made it clear that it is the defendant’s contacts alone that are relevant to 
the minimum contacts analysis.31  As to the second question, the 
essential issue in Hanson was whether the courts of Florida could 
exercise jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee of a trust whose settlor had 
moved to Florida after the creation of the trust.32  The trustee continued 
to administer the trust on behalf of the Florida settlor for the following 
eight years.  And the settlor exercised the power of appointment under 
the trust while in Florida.  Still, the Court found that the trustee lacked 
minimum contacts with Florida sufficient to allow personal 
jurisdiction.33  The Court, relying on International Shoe, described the 
due process standard as follows: “it is essential in each case that there be 
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking 
the benefits of protections of its laws.”34  Thus, the Court transformed 
what International Shoe had considered a natural consequence of a 
defendant’s activities in a state—i.e., enjoying the benefits and 
protections of the laws of that state—into a necessary pre-condition for 
the exercise of jurisdiction.  This is a clear example of the Court falling 
30.  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
31.  In International Shoe, the Court had, in fact, already stated that: 
[N]ow that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons 
or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment in personam, defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within 
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.’  Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (emphasis added). 
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
32.  Hanson, 357 U.S. at 243-44.
33.  Id. at 251.
34.  Id. at 253.
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into a linguistic doctrinal trap.35 
In applying the new “purposeful-availment” test, the Court 
distinguished McGee by noting that, unlike the insurance company there, 
the trustee here had not performed any acts in the forum state that bore 
the same relationship to the trust as did the solicitation of the insurance 
contract at issue in McGee.36  In fact, in the Court’s view, the Florida 
proceeding could not be considered as one initiated to enforce an 
obligation arising from any privilege the nonresident defendant trustee 
had exercised in Florida.37  Thus, according to the Court, the trustee had 
not “purposefully availed” itself of the benefits and protections of 
Florida law.38  Of course, as noted above, this purposeful-availment 
requirement was a product of the Hanson Court’s own creation and, 
most importantly, it was not an absolute precondition to making the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process. 
Even if the Florida courts’ judgment may have made it necessary 
for the Court to clarify the minimum contacts standards, in doing so, the 
Court unfortunately did just the opposite by creating confusion over the 
nature of the contacts that would qualify as meaningful.  It is certainly 
not true that the trust company lacked meaningful connections with the 
state.  Nor is it necessarily the case that the company could not have 
reasonably expected to be sued in Florida on a matter related to the trust.  
After all, the company was aware that the settlor had moved to Florida 
and continued to act as the trustee over the trust and to communicate 
with her in Florida with respect to trust business. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black argued that Florida had 
personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee.39  He observed that the 
object of the controversy was whether the settlor had properly exercised 
her power to appoint beneficiaries under the precise trust being 
administered by the trustee.  In fact, the litigation arose when the 
legatees, under the settlor’s will, brought an action in the Florida courts 
seeking a determination as to whether this appointment was valid.40  
This disposition of her property had very close and substantial 
connections with Florida, since the settlor had appointed the 
beneficiaries in Florida and all of the beneficiaries lived there.  Thus, 
35.  See Allan Ides & Simona Grossi, The Purposeful Availment Trap, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV.
118 (2013). 
36.  Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251-52.
37.  Id. at 252.
38.  Id. at 253.
39.  Id. at 256 (Black, J., dissenting).
40.  Id. at 258.
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Florida had an interest in exercising jurisdiction and applying Florida 
law to determine whether the appointment was indeed valid.  The 
connections between the appointment, the transaction, and the State of 
Florida were thus evident and, of course, the trustee was necessarily 
implicated in this action.  Therefore, in Justice Black’s view, Florida 
courts should have the power to adjudicate a controversy arising out of 
transactions that were so connected to the state, unless litigation there 
would impose such a heavy and disproportionate burden on a 
nonresident defendant that it would offend “traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.”41  But, according to Justice Black, that was 
not case, since the trustee “chose to maintain business relations with [the 
settlor] in that State for eight years, regularly communicating with her 
with respect to the business of the trust including the very appointment 
in question.”42  Moreover, the trustee’s burden of participating as a 
formal (and collateral) party to this dispute over the appointment would 
have been minimal at best. 
Justice Black’s conclusion seems more consistent with 
International Shoe and the rationale behind the jurisdictional formula the 
Court there endorsed—a formula that considers the meaningful contacts 
of the nonresident defendant with the forum and that seeks to ensure that 
the exercise of jurisdiction does not come as an unfair surprise to the 
defendant.  In other words, Justice Black was willing to attend to all of 
the connecting factors and expectations of the parties, while the 
majority, with its myopic focus on “purposeful availment,” was not. 
With the decision in Hanson, we see the beginning of a shift away 
from the fundamental principles that animated the decision in 
International Shoe toward a more technical and mechanistic approach to 
the details of doctrine.43  With Hanson, the minimum contacts test began 
to lose its inherent coherence and strength. 
2. Fundamental Principles Altered: Burger King and Asahi
At issue in Burger King v. Rudzewicz44 was whether a federal court 
sitting in Florida could exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident 
franchisee that had entered into a long-term franchise agreement with the 
plaintiff, a corporate resident of the state.  The bulk of the Court’s 
opinion focused on the purposeful availment requirement, but the Court 
41.  Id. at 259.
42.  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258-59 (1958).
43.  Id. at 253.
44.  Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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added a potential “exit” to the jurisdictional analysis under which a 
strong presumption of jurisdiction established by the connecting factors 
and the reasonable expectation arising of those factors could be rebutted 
under “compelling” circumstances.45  In describing this standard the 
Court suggested that it would apply only when the defendant established 
“the unconstitutionality of” the exercise of jurisdiction by showing a 
severe impairment of the defendant’s ability to defend or assert a 
counterclaim.46  The Court’s application of this additional consideration 
essentially replicated forum non conveniens analysis, strongly suggesting 
this element’s redundancy.47  The Court concluded, however, that the 
heavy presumption in favor of jurisdiction was not rebutted in the case 
before it.48 
Two years later, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,49 a 
case that involved the enforcement of an indemnification agreement 
between two foreign entities, the Court applied the “unreasonableness” 
exit.  In concluding that the exercise of jurisdiction would be 
unreasonable, the Court balanced the interests of the forum, the interest 
of the U.S. judicial system, potential foreign policy considerations, and 
the interests of the parties,50 Again, the Court’s analysis sounded more 
like a forum non conveniens analysis than one that focused on the basics 
of personal jurisdiction, that is, an analysis premised on connecting 
factors and reasonable expectations.51  Nor did the Court’s analysis in 
Asahi suggest that there was any fundamental unfairness in the exercise 
of jurisdiction in the case before it. 
The net result of Burger King and Asahi is that even if a plaintiff 
satisfies the connecting factors and the reasonable expectation 
requirements, a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction under what is 
essentially a balancing of interests, including the court’s own interest in 
the exercise of jurisdiction.52 
3. Fundamental Principles Extended and Withdrawn: Shaffer and
45.  Id. at 477.
46.  Id. at 482-83.
47.  Id. at 482-86.
48.  Id.
49.  Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
50.  Id. at 113-16 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 116 (Brennan, J. concurring).
51.  Id.
52.  The Burger King/Asahi jurisdictional exit is remarkably similar to the subject matter
jurisdiction exit used by the Court in the context of arising under jurisdiction.  See Gunn v. Minton, 
133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).  I examine this phenomenon in detail in A Modified Theory of the Law of 
Federal Courts: The Case of Arising-Under Jurisdiction, supra note 2. 
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Burnham 
In 1977, the Court revisited the theme of personal jurisdiction and, 
specifically, quasi in rem jurisdiction, in Shaffer v. Heitner.53  There, 
Heitner filed a shareholder’s derivative suit in Delaware against the 
Greyhound Corporation, its officers, members of its board of directors, 
and one of its subsidiaries.54  Heitner seized approximately 82,000 
shares of Greyhound stock owned by twenty-one of the defendants in an 
attempt to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction over them in the Delaware 
court.  However, the Supreme Court held that exercising jurisdiction 
would be inconsistent with due process because the property that was 
attached—i.e., the shares—was not related to the plaintiff’s claims, and 
thus the minimum contacts test had not been satisfied.55  Because these 
defendants had no apparent contacts with Delaware other than the shares 
that were attached, their contacts were insufficient to exercise personal 
jurisdiction consistent with due process.56  Since the defendants could 
not reasonably expect to be haled into court in Delaware on claims 
unrelated to their contacts there, said the Court, the Delaware court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over them was inconsistent with the connecting-
factors and reasonable-expectations principles of due process.57 
Thus, in Shaffer, the Court took the fundamental principles of 
International Shoe and extended them to a traditional basis of 
jurisdiction, i.e., the presence of the property within the forum state.  In 
contrast to the Court’s intervention in Hanson, which was not doctrinally 
necessary, the Court’s taking of this case was appropriate to endorse a 
new approach to quasi in rem jurisdiction and to make that form of 
jurisdiction consistent with due process.  The Court, however, failed to 
be adhere to this fundamental-rights approach and the rationale behind it 
when, a few years later, it decided Burnham v. Superior Court58 and 
concluded that not all the traditional bases of personal jurisdiction need 
be consistent with the idea of connecting factors and reasonable 
expectations, i.e., with due process. 
In Burnham, the nine Justices concluded that a California state 
court could exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
who was in the state for only three days attending to matters unrelated to 
the pending action, because he was personally served with process while 
53.  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
54.  Id. at 189.
55.  Id., at 213.
56.  Id. at 216.
57.  Id.
58.  Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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voluntarily present within the state.59  The Court’s majority (the plurality 
and Justice White) believed that the exercise of this so-called tag 
jurisdiction did not violate the “‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice’”60 because, as the plurality puts it, “its validation is 
its pedigree.”61  Thus, the Court’s majority failed to conform this 
traditional method of jurisdiction to the fundamental principles of due 
process and instead relied on “pedigree” as a substitute for those 
principles.  In this sense, tag jurisdiction—at least until the Court revisits 
it—remains a fundamental-principles anomaly.62 
4. Fundamental Principles Suppressed: The Effects Test
In Kulko v. Superior Court,63 the Court considered whether a 
California court could exercise personal jurisdiction “over a nonresident, 
nondomiciliary parent of minor children domiciled within the State.”64  
The California Supreme Court had upheld the exercise of jurisdiction 
under the “effects test,” the father having sent his daughter into 
California to live permanently with her mother.65  In so ruling, the state 
high court explained why it thought that the father had purposefully 
availed himself of the benefits and protections of California law: 
59.  Id.  Interestingly, however, Justice Brennan, commenting on Justice Scalia’s reliance on
historical precedents to justify transient jurisdiction in his concurring opinion, observed: 
[R]eliance solely on historical pedigree . . . is foreclosed by our decisions in 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington and Shaffer v. Heitner . . . .  The critical insight of 
Shaffer is that all rules of jurisdiction, even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary 
notions of due process. . . . 
While our holding in Shaffer may have been limited to quasi in rem jurisdiction, our 
mode of analysis was not. 
Id. at 629-30 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  However, Justice Brennan’s minimum 
contacts analysis, as applied to transient jurisdiction, was so broad as to be meaningless for the 
purpose of subjecting the transient jurisdiction analysis to the minimum contacts test.  In fact, his 
test was such that persons transitorily present in the forum state would almost always have the 
necessary minimum contacts to make the exercise of transient jurisdiction valid.  See Robert Taylor-
Manning, An Easy Case Makes Bad Law—Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct. 
2105 (1990), 66 WASH. L. REV. 623, 631-32 (1991). 
60.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
61.  Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621.
62.  See FRIEDENTHAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 5, at 171-72 (questioning whether the
efficiencies of Burnham’s bright-line rule “outweigh the costs of the injustices it may allow”); 
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth and Forum 
Conveniens 65 YALE L.J. 289, 303-04 (1956) (criticizing transient jurisdiction as a relic of 
Pennoyer v. Neff). 
63.  Kulko v. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
64.  Id. at 86. 
65.  Id. at 89.
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[P]robably no parental act more fully invokes the benefits and 
protections of California law than that by which a parent permits his 
minor child to live in California.  The parent thereby avails himself of 
the total panoply of the state’s laws, institutions and resources—its 
police and fire protection, its school system, its hospital services, its 
recreational facilities, its libraries and museums, to mention only a 
few.66 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Hanson’s purposeful 
availment “requirement” had not been satisfied here.67  The Court 
disagreed with the California Supreme Court’s purposeful availment 
analysis in a single sentence placed in a footnote: “[I]n the 
circumstances presented here, these services provided by the State were 
essentially benefits to the child, not the father, and in any event were not 
benefits that appellant purposefully sought for himself.”68 
The Kulko Court approached purposeful availment as a technical, 
non-contextual requirement.  Instead of engaging in a realistic appraisal 
of the facts, as the California Supreme Court had done, the U.S. 
Supreme Court simply concluded, without elaboration, that it was the 
child that was benefitting from California laws and protections, not the 
father.  Thus, the Kulko Court overlooked the meaningful contacts that 
the father had with California.  In this way, Kulko is quite similar to 
Hanson in that the Court in both cases used a technical doctrine to avoid 
a realistic appraisal of the facts.69 
The Kulko Court further confused the law of jurisdiction by 
observing, “In light of our conclusion that appellant did not purposefully 
derive benefit from any activities relating to the State of California, it is 
apparent that the California Supreme Court’s reliance on appellant’s 
having caused an ‘effect’ in California was misplaced.”70  Here, the 
Court was referring to § 37 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws, the so-called “effects test.”71  Of course, that test contains no 
66.  Kulko v. Super. Ct., 564 P.2d 353, 356 (1977), rev’d, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
67.  Kulko, 436 U.S. at 94.
68.  Id. at 94 n.7.
69.  It is possible that the Court tortured the standard of personal jurisdiction in order to
advance a policy of fairness in the context of child-support proceedings.  But even that instinct was 
misplaced, since the father in Kulko had in fact waived any objection to personal jurisdiction in the 
child-custody proceeding (as opposed to the child-custody aspect of the proceeding).  Kulko, 436 
U.S. at 88.  Thus, any unfairness to the father in being required to defend the support proceeding 
would seem to have been misplaced. 
70.  Id. at 96. 
71.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971).  Section 37 provides: 
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects 
in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from 
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purposeful availment requirement.  In fact, the test was specifically 
designed to embrace circumstances where purposeful availment could 
not logically be satisfied and yet where the exercise of jurisdiction 
would be consistent with due process.72  By suggesting that purposeful 
availment was nonetheless a prerequisite to the effects test, the Kulko 
Court strayed further from the fundamentals of due process by allowing 
a court to deny the exercise of jurisdiction when due process would in 
fact be satisfied. 
After Kulko, the case-by-case approach continued to erode the 
coherence and strength of the minimum contacts formula.  In Calder v. 
Jones,73 the Court applied the effects test in the context of an intentional 
tort.  There, the Court held that California courts could exercise 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant journalists who had written and 
edited a libelous story concerning the California activities of Jones, a 
California resident, knowing that Jones would feel the brunt of the harm 
there.74  The Court explained: 
The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a 
California resident.  It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer 
whose television career was centered in California.  The article was 
drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms 
both of respondent’s emotional distress and the injury to her 
professional reputation, was suffered in California.  In sum, California 
is the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered. 
Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on 
the “effects” of their Florida conduct in California. . . . 
[Petitioners’] intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly 
aimed at California.  Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder 
edited an article that they knew would have a potentially devastating 
impact upon respondent.  And they knew that the brunt of that injury 
would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works 
and in which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation.  Under 
the circumstances, petitioners must “reasonably anticipate being 
hauled into court there” to answer for the truth of the statements made 
in their article.75 
these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual’s relationship to the 
state make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable. 
Id. 
72.  Id. at cmt. a.
73.  Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
74.  Id. at 791.
75.  See id. at 788-89.
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If we were to take the above passage as merely descriptive of the 
Court’s reasoning, it might be seen as an unremarkable application of the 
law of minimum contacts to the facts of the particular case.  But if this 
passage is meant to signify the endorsement of a particular doctrinal 
model, it is troubling for two reasons. 
First, it is completely unnecessary in light of the more general 
principles established in International Shoe.  Clearly, both the writer and 
the editor who were sued in Calder had significant claim-related 
connections with California (as the above passage makes clear).  These 
connecting factors should have led to an expectation of being subject to 
jurisdiction in a California court on a claim so closely tied to those 
connections.  In other words, no special test was needed to establish 
jurisdiction under these facts. 
Second, the doctrinal formula described by the Court is 
significantly narrower than the Restatement’s version of the effects test. 
Under the Court’s doctrinal formula, jurisdiction may be established 
under the effects test if: (1) the nonresident defendant had committed an 
intentional tort, (2) that was aimed at the forum State, and (3) with the 
knowledge that the plaintiff would feel the “brunt” of the harm in the 
forum State.76  The effects test under the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws, however, can be satisfied “when the defendant did not 
intend to cause the particular effect in the state but could reasonably 
have foreseen that it would result from his act done outside the state.”77  
This formula includes no requirement of “aim” or “brunt;” nor is this 
formula limited to intentional torts.  In this way, the Restatement version 
of the effects test more fully embraces the fundamental principles of due 
process since it calls for examinations of all meaningful contacts.  The 
Calder formula, by contrast, is completely mechanical and, as such, 
inflexible and incapable of taking into account and measuring 
connections and expectations beyond the narrow contours of the 
doctrinal formula. 
One possible response is to say that the Calder formula merely 
described a sufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction, not a necessary 
one.  That would be a welcome reading, but it is unfortunately not the 
reading that a majority of lower federal courts have adopted.78  Even if 
76.  Id.
77.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971). 
78.  See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1206 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1163 (2006); Fielding v. Hubert Bunda Media, Inc., 415 F.3d 
419, 429 (5th Cir. 2005); IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1998).  See 
also IDES & MAY, supra note 10, at 137-38; infra notes 86-103 and accompanying text. 
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this sufficient-but-not-necessary reading of Calder were to be adopted, 
we would still be left with the “why-bother” question, i.e., why add to 
the doctrinal jargon if the basic standards would have been sufficient to 
resolve the questions presented?  In short, Calder presents a classic 
example of the technicalities of doctrine supplanting the fundamental 
principles on which the doctrine is based. 
5. Fundamental Principles Submerged: The Stream of Commerce
Test 
The “stream of commerce” doctrine provides yet another example 
of mechanistic doctrine deflecting the jurisdictional inquiry from the 
fundamental principles that ought to govern.  Moreover, this example of 
the phenomenon is particularly troubling since “stream of commerce” is 
a completely redundant doctrine in that the effects test (as contemplated 
in the Restatement) is itself fully capable of embracing all the situations 
to which stream of commerce potentially applies.  In fact, there is not a 
single stream of commerce decision that could not be fully and 
adequately resolved under the Restatement’s effects test.  In this sense, 
stream of commerce is a double-filtered deflection from the fundamental 
inquiry into due process. 
The stream of commerce refers to the chain of distribution of a 
product that goes from the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer.  A 
manufacturer producing a product in a state or foreign nation, and 
intentionally selling it through a chain of distribution that may employ 
exporters, importers, distributors and retailers, is considered to have 
purposefully affiliated itself with the state where the ultimate consumer 
is located and the injury occurs. 
This test traces its roots to Gray v. American Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp., a sensible 1961 decision by the Illinois Supreme Court 
that was premised largely on the fundamentals of due process and in 
which the phrase “stream of commerce” never appears.79  In Gray, the 
plaintiff was injured when a water heater she purchased in Illinois 
exploded there, allegedly due to a defective safety valve.  The valve was 
manufactured in Ohio and then shipped to Pennsylvania where it was 
placed on the water heater.  The water heater was then shipped into 
Illinois for retail purchase.  Plaintiff sued both the manufacturer of the 
water heater, a Pennsylvania company, and the manufacturer of the 
valve, an Ohio company, in an Illinois court.  The valve manufacturer 
79.  Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
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moved to quash service, arguing that it was not subject to personal 
jurisdiction in Illinois, as it did not do business there and had no 
registered agent for service there.80  The trial court quashed service, but 
the Illinois Supreme Court reversed.81  After holding that the Illinois 
long-arm statute was sufficiently broad to permit the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the valve manufacturer, the court turned to the question 
of whether the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with due 
process.82 
Interestingly enough, the Illinois Supreme Court did not use the 
phrase “stream of commerce” nor did it purport to be creating a new 
jurisdictional doctrine.  Rather, the court simply relied on fundamental 
principles derived from International Shoe and McGee, among other 
cases, to explain why the exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign 
manufacturer comported with due process: 
In the case at bar defendant does not claim that the present use of its 
product in Illinois is an isolated instance.  While the record does not 
disclose the volume of Titan’s business or the territory in which 
appliances incorporating its valves are marketed, it is a reasonable 
inference that its commercial transactions, like those of other 
manufacturers, result in substantial use and consumption in this State.  
To the extent that its business may be directly affected by transactions 
occurring here it enjoys benefits from the laws of this State, and it has 
undoubtedly benefited, to a degree, from the protection which our law 
has given to the marketing of hot water heaters containing its valves.83 
Eventually, the Illinois Supreme Court’s careful consideration of due 
process principles acquired the “stream of commerce” label.  That label 
then evolved into a doctrine and, nearly twenty years after the decision 
in Gray, the U.S. Supreme Court, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson,84 endorsed the doctrine by way of dicta: 
The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process 
Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers 
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they 
will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.  Cf. Gray v. 
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 
80.  Id. at 762.
81.  Id. at 762 & 767.
82.  Id. at 763.
83.  Id. at 766.
84.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. V. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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N.E.2d 761 (1961).85 
Given the fundamentals of the due process standard as embodied in the 
minimum contacts test, this endorsement would seem to have been 
completely superfluous.  After all, the Illinois state court had properly 
understood International Shoe and applied it in a “stream of commerce” 
context, reaching the same result the official “stream of commerce” 
doctrine would have achieved. 
Of course, the specific act or conduct sufficient to meet the due 
process requirement must be identified and described by a court 
applying the minimum contacts test, but this description need not, in 
itself, create new doctrine.  If each such description creates a new 
jurisdictional doctrine or an offshoot of settled doctrine, the law of due 
process becomes nothing more than a complex web of fact-specific 
outcomes, further and further removed from the core principles of the 
due process standard.  Under such an evolving-standards model, each 
fact-specific decision by the Supreme Court will inevitably offer new 
possibilities for gaps in the existing web, generating yet another neatly 
labeled jurisdictional doctrine. 
A few years after World-Wide Volkswagen incanted the magic 
phrase “stream of commerce,” the Court granted certiorari in Asahi 
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court86 to resolve a conflict that had 
arisen in lower courts over the scope of what had become the stream-of-
commerce test.  Some of those courts required that a manufacturer, 
whose goods reached the forum state through the stream of commerce, 
to have also taken some affirmative action to promote the sales of its 
products within that state, i.e., a so-called “plus factor.”87  Other courts 
did not require the plus factor.88  The Supreme Court was unable to 
resolve the conflict and instead split four-to-four, with one Justice 
declining to address the question.89 
While the Asahi Court did not provide any direction to the lower 
courts as to the scope of the stream-of-commerce test, it did do one thing 
with respect to cases arising in this context.  It made it clear that the 
unresolved question—plus or no plus?—was quintessentially technical 
and doctrinal, and not premised on the fundamental due process 
questions pertaining to connecting factors, expectations or, more 
85.  Id. at 298-99.
86.  Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
87.  Id. at 111-12 (citing cases).
88.  Id. at 111 (citing cases).
89.  See id. at 116 (Brennan, J. concurring in the judgment); id. at 121 (Stevens, J.
concurring). 
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generally, fairness and reasonableness.  Basically, Asahi pressed 
International Shoe further into the background. 
The Court’s most recent foray into the stream of commerce test 
came in 2011 with the decision in J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. 
Nicastro.90  In McIntyre, the plurality admitted that “[t]his Court’s Asahi 
decision may be responsible in part for [the state] court’s error regarding 
the stream of commerce, and this case presents an opportunity to provide 
greater clarity.”91  In short, it was time to eliminate the confusion.92  
However, despite the Court’s good intentions, no greater clarity was 
provided and, worse, as Justice Ginsburg convincingly explained in her 
dissent, International Shoe and the minimum contacts test would have 
easily resolved the case and demanded a different outcome.93 
In many ways, the decision in McIntyre provides a perfect exemplar 
of the potential deficiencies of the modern case-by-case doctrinal 
approach to due process.  In McIntyre, the plaintiff, Nicastro severely 
injured his hand while using a metal-shearing machine manufactured by 
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. (McIntyre UK).  Nicastro filed a products-
liability action against McIntyre UK and others in a New Jersey state 
court.  The accident occurred in New Jersey, but the machine was 
manufactured in England, where McIntyre UK was incorporated and 
operated.  McIntyre UK did not directly market its products in New 
Jersey nor did it ship any of them there.  However, McIntyre UK had a 
relationship with an independent distributor, McIntyre Machinery 
America, Ltd. (McIntyre America), that promoted and sold McIntyre’s 
machines in the United States market.  In addition, McIntyre UK’s 
representatives attended trade shows in Chicago, Las Vegas, New 
Orleans, Orlando, San Diego, and San Francisco, all to promote sales of 
its products throughout the United States.  At one of those conventions 
in Las Vegas, where McIntyre UK was an exhibitor, Nicastro’s 
employer learned of McIntyre UK’s machine, and decided to buy one.  
McIntyre America then shipped the machine to New Jersey where it 
eventually injured Nicastro.  The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the 
exercise of jurisdiction in New Jersey over McIntyre UK.94 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  There was no 
90.  J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
91.  Id. at 2786.
92.  As Professor Arthur Miller has observed, “Trying to determine what the diverging
opinions [in McIntyre] mean to counsel in the coming years presents a bit of a mystery.”  4 FED. 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.4 (3d. ed. 2013). 
93.  McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794-95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94.  Id. at 2786 (plurality).
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majority opinion for the Court.95  The four-person plurality opinion 
authored by Justice Kennedy correctly observed that the stream of 
commerce test—which it called a “metaphor”—was not a substitute for 
due process analysis, but then went on to define stream of commerce in a 
manner that created a shield to any consideration of the due process 
fundamentals.96  The plurality’s definition of stream of commerce was 
concise, but virtually empty of content.  In the words of the McIntyre 
plurality, “[t]he defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise 
of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the 
forum.”97  The “target” metaphor is left unexplained, though it seems 
akin to the “aim” element of the effects test.  It would seem then that the 
plurality endorsed a narrow, doctrinal “metaphor” that, while not a 
“substitute” for due process analysis, operates to prevent a court from 
ever getting to a true due process analysis by creating a gate-keeping 
standard that prevents consideration of the fundamental fairness 
principles established in International Shoe.  Similarly, Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion adopted his own “single-sale” limitation on use of 
the stream-of-commerce approach, thereby obviating any need to look 
into the fundamental due process concerns triggered by the facts in such 
cases.98 
As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent: 
McIntyre UK’s regular attendance and exhibitions . . . was surely a 
purposeful step to reach customers for its products “anywhere in the 
United States.”  At least as purposeful was McIntyre UK’s engagement 
of McIntyre America as the conduit for sales of McIntyre UK’s 
machines to buyers “throughout the United States.”  Given McIntyre 
UK’s endeavors to reach and profit from the United States market as a 
whole, Nicastro’s suit, I would hold, has been brought in a forum 
entirely appropriate for the adjudication of his claim.  He alleges that 
McIntyre UK’s shear machine was defectively designed or 
manufactured and, as a result, caused injury to him at his workplace.  
The machine arrived in Nicastro’s New Jersey workplace not randomly 
or fortuitously, but as a result of the U.S. connections and distribution 
system that McIntyre UK deliberately arranged.99 
Justice Ginsburg was right.  International Shoe would have recognized 
these connecting factors as creating a reasonable expectation of a lawsuit 
95.  Id. at 2785 (plurality); id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
96.  Id. at 2785 (plurality).
97.  J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 88 (2011). 
98.  Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
99.  Id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
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in those forums where the marketing strategy succeeded and where a 
product-based injury occurred.100  Although her instinct was correct, 
Justice Ginsburg also took a misstep.  Rather than focusing on the 
fundamental principles established in International Shoe, she then tried 
to fit the case into her own reformulation of the stream-of-commerce 
test, one with a “national contacts” overlay.  Specifically, she noted: 
In sum, McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to promote and 
sell its machines in the United States, “purposefully availed itself” of 
the United States market nationwide, not a market in a single State or a 
discrete collection of States.  McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of the 
market of all States in which its products were sold by its exclusive 
distributor.101 
One of the ironies of McIntyre is that the New Jersey state courts seemed 
to have understood the fundamental principles at stake, and displayed a 
stronger intuitive sense of their scope and operation of those 
principles102 than did the Supreme Court.  Unfortunately, the Justices of 
the Supreme Court appeared to be trapped in and confused by their own 
personalized tests and by the interpretations of their own interpretations. 
As a consequence, what was in fact a relatively simple case of a 
nonresident defendant whose commercial activities manifested its intent 
to affiliate itself through commercial activity in the forum state set the 
100.  Justice Ginsburg observed: 
A foreign industrialist seeks to develop a market in the United States for machines it 
manufactures.  It hopes to derive substantial revenue from sales it makes to United States 
purchasers.  Where in the United States buyers reside does not matter to this 
manufacturer.  Its goal is simply to sell as much as it can, wherever it can.  It excludes no 
region or State from the market it wishes to reach.  But, all things considered, it prefers 
to avoid products liability litigation in the United States.  To that end, it engages a U.S. 
distributor to ship its machines stateside.  Has it succeeded in escaping personal 
jurisdiction in a State where one of its products is sold and causes injury or even death to 
a local user?  Under this Court’s pathmarking precedent in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), and subsequent decisions, one would expect the 
answer to be unequivocally, “No.”  But instead, six Justices of this Court, in divergent 
opinions, tell us that the manufacturer has avoided the jurisdiction of our state courts, 
except perhaps in States where its products are sold in sizeable quantities.  Inconceivable 
as it may have seemed yesterday, the splintered majority today “turn[s] the clock back to 
the days before modern long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into 
court where a user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having 
independent distributors market it.”  (citing Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the 
Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 555 (1995)). 
Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
101.  Id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
 102.  Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 945 A.2d 92, 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 2010). 
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stage for yet further confusion and new doctrinal twists.103  In short, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court recognized what was obvious and 
fundamental, and thus got it right, but the U.S. Supreme Court, engaged 
in doctrinal contretemps, did not. 
As noted above, stream of commerce is, in essence, a specialized 
version of the effects test.  By manufacturing a product outside of the 
state and then placing it into the “stream of commerce” with the 
expectation and, indeed, the hope that it will reach the forum state, the 
manufacturer has caused a totally foreseeable effect in the forum state 
through activities undertaken elsewhere if the product in fact reaches 
that state and injures a consumer there.  Not surprisingly, the 
Restatement therefore considers “stream of commerce” to be an 
expression of the effects test: 
The causing of effects in a state by means of an act done outside the 
state is today a jurisdictional basis of immense importance.  Many of 
the current court decisions involve this basis.  It plays a particularly 
significant role in the area of product liability.  A common situation is 
where a product is taken from one state to another and there causes 
injury or is the subject of some other claim as, for example, one for 
breach of warranty.  The question then arises whether the state to 
which the product has been taken has judicial jurisdiction over, as the 
case may be, the out-of-state manufacturer, assembler, importer, 
distributor or ultimate seller.  Frequently, the answer will be in the 
affirmative.104 
Thus, for the same reasons that the effects test (as contemplated by the 
Restatement) is a product of the fundamentals of due process—
connecting factors and reasonable expectations—so, too, is the stream of 
commerce test.  However, to the extent that either the effects test or the 
stream of commerce test operates as a mechanistic gatekeeper to the 
fundamental questions of due process, the test undermines the principles 
it should in fact serve. 
From this review of the Supreme Court’s post-International Shoe 
cases, it should now be clear that the increasing lack of any uniform 
rules, and the development of redundant, misguided, increasingly fact-
specific tests, have confused the Supreme Court as to the real scope of 
the minimum contacts test.  As a consequence, the results have been 
often contradictory and inconsistent, and increasingly distant from the 
fundamental principles of due process. 
103.  See Ides, supra note 7 at 345. 
104.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Commentary to § 37 (1971). 
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B. Doctrinal Confusion in State and Lower Federal Courts 
1. The Post-Hanson Meaning of “Purposeful Availment”
The “purposeful availment” requirement established in Hanson has 
led not only to confusion, but also to the rejection of jurisdiction in cases 
where its exercise would comport with the due process principles 
endorsed in International Shoe.  The decision of the California Supreme 
Court in Sibley v. Superior Court105 provides an illustrative example.  In 
that case, the question was whether an out-of-state guarantor on a 
contractual performance to be undertaken in California could be 
subjected to jurisdiction in a California court based simply on having 
caused an effect in the state.106  The California Supreme Court held that 
despite the obvious effect caused by the guarantor—the guaranty led to a 
contract that was to be performed in California—jurisdiction could not 
be exercised over the nonresident guarantor.107  This is consistent with 
Hanson, since the guarantor had not sought any California benefit from 
the transaction or, stated differently, he had not “purposefully availed 
himself of the privilege of conducting business in California or of the 
benefits and protections of California laws.”108  In essence, Sibley 
applied “purposeful availment” literally,109 thus creating a doctrinal 
limitation on jurisdiction wholly inconsistent with due process principles 
of connecting factors and reasonable expectations. 
The decision in Sibley should not be seen as aberrational or a 
maverick.  As recently as 2012, the Supreme Court of Kansas declared 
that “the ‘effects’ test in Calder does not, however, replace the need to 
demonstrate minimum contacts that constitute purposeful availment—
that is conduct by the non-resident defendant that invoked the benefits 
and protections of the state or was otherwise purposefully directed 
toward a state resident.”110  Under this approach, the effects test is 
rendered superfluous since whether it is satisfied, the jurisdictional 
decision must ultimately rest on the principle of “purposeful availment.”  
While the Kansas court, to its credit, rejected a mechanical reliance on 
the “effects test,” it then fell back on another mechanical test, namely, 
“purposeful availment.”111 
105.  Sibley v. Super. Ct., 546 P.2d 322 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976). 
106.  Id. at 323. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. at 325. 
109.  Sibley was overruled by Kulko v. Superior Court, 564 P.2d 353(1977). 
110.  See Aeroflex Wichita, Inc. v. Filardo, 275 P.3d 869, 885 (Kan. 2012). 
111.  Id. at 889. 
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Hanson and its absolute “purposeful availment” requirement, has 
even infected the realm of statutory interpretation—to the extent that 
courts seek to interpret jurisdictional statutes so as to preserve their 
constitutionality.  Thus, in Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz,112 the New York 
Court of Appeals, interpreting the state’s long-arm statute, imposed a 
type of purposeful availment requirement on the exercise of jurisdiction 
that excluded use of the effects test in situations where its application 
would have been totally consistent with due process.  Hence, the 
doctrinal error of Hanson was imported into the statutory law of New 
York. 
At the same time, other courts were construing “purposeful 
availment” to embrace jurisdiction premised on a nonresident 
defendant’s causing an effect in the forum state.113  Eventually, some 
courts came to recognize that the purposeful availment standard was, at 
best, incomplete since it did not encompass anything like the full range 
of jurisdiction permitted under the due process clause.  As the Ninth 
Circuit explained in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et 
L’Antisemitisme,114 the phrase “purposeful availment” is inappropriate in 
situations where a nonresident has committed an intentional tort outside 
the state with foreseeable effects in the state.  In that context, even 
though the defendant cannot be said to have availed himself of the 
forum’s benefits, the exercise of jurisdiction would nevertheless be 
consistent with due process.  It is enough, according to the Ninth Circuit, 
that the defendant’s relationship with the state was a product of 
“purposeful direction.”115  Thus, by asking the right question—what 
factors connect the defendant’s activity to the forum state—the Ninth 
Circuit wisely moved the doctrine back toward the fundamentals of due 
process by its willingness to jettison a requirement of “purposeful 
availment” in favor of a realistic appraisal of a connecting factor.116 
112.  Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830 (N.Y. 2007). 
 113.  See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965) (in chambers opinion of 
Justice Goldberg) (holding that the purposeful availment standard generally requires “requirement 
that the defendant must have taken voluntary action calculated to have an effect in the forum state.”  
(quoting David P. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm, 1963 U. ILL. L. F. 533, 549 (1963))); 
Walker v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir. 1978) (purposeful availment satisfied if defendant’s 
out of state actions have “foreseeable effects” in the forum).  Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. 
v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972) (caused consequences in the forum).
114.  Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir.
2006). 
115.  Id. at 1206. 
116.  Id. at 1205-08. 
27
Grossi: Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014
644 AKRON LAW REVIEW [47:617 
2. The Effects Test
As I have noted, the measure of jurisdiction for activities taking 
place outside a state that cause an effect within the state should require 
no more than a straightforward application of the due process standards 
described by the Court in International Shoe.  If that activity causes a 
foreseeable effect in the state, the party who engaged in that activity will 
likely have a reasonable expectation of being sued in the forum on a 
claim arising out of that effect.  The Restatement version of the effects 
test was written to capture the wide range of possibilities that might arise 
in this context.117  The doctrinal version of the effects test that has 
emerged from the decision in Calder v. Jones,118 however, appears to be 
more circumscribed and less likely to embrace the full range of due 
process possibilities.  As a consequence, plaintiffs are often denied 
access to a forum to which they are entitled. 
Lower federal court opinions applying the effects test can be 
correctly described as including a “mixture of broad and narrow 
interpretations.”119  As one court phrased it, in an obvious 
understatement, federal courts “have struggled somewhat with Calder’s 
import.”120  The range of interpretations does, however, appear to share a 
common premise: the elements that the Calder Court identified as being 
sufficient to satisfy due process—i.e., an intentional tort, aimed at the 
forum, with the brunt of the harm felt there—have been transformed 
from the sufficient into the necessary.  Hence, a set of circumstances 
under which due process was deemed to have been satisfied is now 
treated as defining the limits of due process.  In this way, the doctrine 
has come to trump the constitutional due process standard. 
Consistent with the foregoing, the Third Circuit has limited the 
effects test to the following circumstances: 
The defendant committed an intentional tort; (2) The plaintiff felt the 
brunt of the harm in the forum such that the forum can be said to be the 
focal point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of that tort; 
(3) The defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum 
such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the tortious 
 117.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 37 (1971), Reporter’s Note 
(explaining that the many cases described involve different factual situations). 
118.  Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
119.  IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 1998). 
120.  Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000).  See 
generally IDES & MAY, supra note 10, at 137-38. 
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activity. . . .121 
As to the first element, the First Circuit has taken even a narrower view 
and suggested that the effects test should be limited to defamation cases 
only.122  As to the third element, “aim,” the Fifth Circuit requires that (1) 
the subject matter of and (2) the sources relied upon for the article to 
have been from the forum state.123  On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit 
has somewhat softened the edges of the second element, the “brunt” 
requirement, by demanding only a “foreseeable harm” in the forum.124  
At the same time, however, it has refused to apply the effects test to a 
contracts claim,125 which is somewhat peculiar since the effects test was 
specifically designed to reflect personal jurisdiction decisions involving 
contracts.126  The one circuit court decision that appeared to adopt a 
more open-ended approach to the effects test has been limited by a 
subsequent decision of that same circuit.127 
Ironically, in some cases where the elements of the three-part 
effects test would be satisfied, a federal court will nonetheless conclude 
that the assertion of jurisdiction would violate due process, without 
reference to the effects test.  For example, in Fox v. Boucher,128 a 
landlord in New York brought diversity action for a prima facie tort 
against the father of a tenant.  The defendant was a resident of 
Massachusetts.  The plaintiff landlord alleged that the defendant made a 
single telephone call from Massachusetts to the plaintiff in New York, 
and that the comments of the defendant during that phone call caused the 
plaintiff extreme mental and physical suffering.129  Finding that the 
defendant’s contacts with New York were not sufficient to satisfy due 
process, a New York court held that: 
One single telephone call made to New York State is insufficient 
contact to support a suit initiated in that forum against an out-of-state 
resident under either the contract or tort provisions [of New York’s 
long-arm statute] of CPLR 302.  The mere possibility of foreseeable 
121.  See IMO Indus., Inc., 155 F.3d at 265–66. 
122.  See United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 624 (1st Cir. 2001). 
123.  Fielding v. Hubert Bunda Media, Inc., 415 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2005). 
124.  Fiore v. Walden, 657 F.3d 838, 848-53 (9th Cir. 2011). 
125.  McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 817 (9th Cir. 1988). 
126.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 37 (1971), cmt. a. 
127.  See Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200 (7th Cir. 1997) (“effects” jurisdiction 
sustained in the absence of aim); but see Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 705-06 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 567 (2010) (interpreting Janmark as requiring “something more” directed at 
the forum). 
128.  Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1986). 
129.  Id. at 36-37. 
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consequences in New York does not give New York in personam 
jurisdiction.  As the Supreme Court states there must be “some act by 
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws.”  It would offend “minimum contacts” due 
process principles to force [the defendant], a Massachusetts resident, to 
litigate in a New York forum on the basis of one telephone call.130 
Here, although the tort consisted in a single contact, i.e., a single phone 
call to the state, the three-part effects test seems to have been satisfied: 
(1) the defendant committed an intentional tort (i.e., an act constituting 
intentional infliction of emotional distress), (2) the phone call was aimed 
at the plaintiff in the forum state (in fact, the defendant dialed the New 
York area code when making the phone call), and (3) the defendant 
knew that the plaintiff lived in New York and, thus, that he would have 
felt the brunt of the harm there.  The doctrinal “tripping” point for the 
Fox court seems to have been the abstraction of purposeful availment, an 
appendage to the principles of due process imposed by the Court in 
Hanson.131  However, the Court in International Shoe made it clear that 
even a single contact could be a sufficient basis on which to assert 
jurisdiction,132 and reaffirmed that principle in McGee.133  Perhaps the 
exercise of jurisdiction in Fox would have been unreasonable under the 
circumstances, but that question differs markedly from issues pertaining 
to the sufficiency of the connecting factors.134 
State courts, often relying on federal precedents, have adopted 
similarly narrow versions of the effects test.  Pavlovich v. Superior 
Court,135 a decision by the California Supreme Court, provides a good 
example.  In that case, the licensor of encryption technology used to 
prevent the copying of DVDs containing motion pictures sued a resident 
of Texas for misappropriation of trade secrets for having posted on the 
internet the source code that would allow the decryption and copying of 
those DVDs.  The suit was filed in a California state court.  The 
130.  Id. at 37 (citations omitted). 
131.  See supra text accompanying notes 30-38. 
132.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (citing Kane v. New 
Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927)). 
133.  See supra text accompanying notes 25-29. 
 134.  To be precise, it is not proper to talk about “purposeful availment” in a tort situation.  As 
the Ninth Circuit has correctly indicated, in torts contexts it is more appropriate to say that, by 
committing the tort, the nonresident defendant “purposefully directs” his activity towards the forum 
State, rather than saying that he “purposefully avails” himself of the benefit and protection of the 
laws of the state.  Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 
1205-06 (9th Cir. 2006). 
135.  Pavlovich v. Super. Ct., 58 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002). 
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assertion of jurisdiction was premised on the theory that the defendant 
should have known that his actions would have an adverse impact on the 
motion picture industry located in that state.136  In ruling that jurisdiction 
could not be asserted consistently with due process, the California 
Supreme Court relied largely on federal precedents interpreting the 
scope of the effects test, and in so doing, endorsed the Third Circuit’s 
three-part formula.137  The specific issue before the California Supreme 
Court was whether the “aim” prong of the test could be satisfied by the 
mere knowledge that the posting would have an adverse effect in 
California.138  The court concluded that mere knowledge was insufficient 
to satisfy that prong.139  Thus, the California Supreme Court participated 
in the refinement of a doctrine—knowledge does not satisfy aim—that is 
ever more precise and yet ever more removed from the fundamental due 
process inquiry.140 
As one might infer from the Pavlovich decision, the case-by-case 
method can be expected to give rise to yet further doctrinal 
complications in cases involving the internet.  While beyond the scope 
of this discussion, it is fair to note that jurisdictional law relating to the 
internet, like the effects test itself, tends to deflect the jurisdictional 
consideration away from the fundamentals of due process and into the 
technicalities of the “Zippo” doctrine141 and other like “refinements” on 
the law of jurisdiction. 
3. The Stream of Commerce Test
The stream of commerce test has provided a considerable source of 
confusion in lower federal courts.  As one commentator observed, 
Personal jurisdiction analysis now varies depending on which circuit a 
litigant files in.  If a plaintiff is savvy enough to pick a circuit 
embracing Brennan’s foreseeability view, minimum contacts will 
likely be found.  This is particularly true where that same jurisdiction, 
136.  Id. at 6. 
137.  Id. at 8. 
138.  Id. at 9-10. 
139.  Id. at 11. 
140.  State courts have taken an array of approaches to the effects test.  See, e.g., Aeroflex 
Wichita, Inc. v. Filardo, 275 P.3d 869 (Kan. 2012) (effects test requires a separate showing of 
purposeful availment); Davis v. Simon, 963 N.E.2d 46, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that some 
federal courts treat the three-part test as mandatory, but declining to take a position on that 
question); Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (three-part test, but 
“knowledge that the effects would be felt” in the forum substituted for “brunt”); Pitts v. Fink, 698 
S.E.2d 626, 632 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (strict three-part test). 
141.  Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
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after finding “purposeful conduct” then transfers the burden to the 
defendant to demonstrate “unfairness.”  Conversely, if a plaintiff files 
in the First, Fourth, Sixth, or Eleventh Circuits, a finding of personal 
jurisdiction may be less likely, given the same facts, because those 
circuits employ the O’Connor test requiring a much more specialized 
showing to reach “purposeful conduct.”142 
Prior to the 2011 decision in McIntyre, the First,143 Fourth,144 and 
Sixth,145 Circuits had adopted the O’Connor stream of commerce plus 
test, while the Fifth,146 Seventh,147 and Eighth148 Circuits opted for 
Brennan’s pure stream of commerce formula.149  Other federal circuit 
courts declined to decide the issue and instead used both tests, as well as 
Justice Stevens’ alternate approach.150  Panels in the Eleventh Circuit 
have both adopted and declined to adopt the plus test.151  At least one 
circuit has noted the substantial confusion over the content of the 
doctrine.152  Federal district courts are in an equal state of disarray153 and 
 142.  Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain’t the Texas Two Step Folks: Disharmony, Confusion, and 
the Unfair Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fifth Circuit, 37 CAP. U.L. REV. 681, 
682-83 (2009).  Note that the Eleventh Circuit has taken contrary positions on this issue.  Compare 
Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990) (O’Connor plus) with Vermeulen v. Renault, 
U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 907 (1993) (opting not to make 
a choice). 
143.  Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992) (same). 
 144.  Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 945–46 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 1151 (1995) (same). 
145.  Fortis Corporate Ins. v. Viken Ship Mgmt., 450 F.3d 214, 220 (6th Cir. 2006). 
146.  Luv N’ Care v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 904 
(2006). 
147.  Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 148.  Clune v. Alimak AB, 233 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929 
(2001). 
149.  See, e.g., Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 613–15 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 948 (1994) (following Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce test); 
Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); Dehmlow v. 
Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992) (same). 
 150.  See, e.g., Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 175 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 1999); Pennzoil 
Products Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 1998); Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 
F.3d 1541, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1122 (1995) (following International Shoe 
purposeful availment test for patent infringement cases); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 
F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 907 (1993). 
 151.  Compare Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1519 (11th Cir. 1993) (O’Connor plus) with 
Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 907 
(1993) (opting not to make a choice). 
 152.  See Commissariat A L’Energie Atomique v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 395 F.3d 
1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
153.  See, e.g., Askue v. Aurora Corp. of Am., No. 1:10-cv-0984-JEC, 2012 WL 843939, at 
*5-6 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2012); Newman v. European Aero. Def. & Space Co., No. 09-10138-DJC,
2011 WL 2413792, at *5 (D. Mass. June 16, 2011); Belden Tech., Inc. v. LS Corp., 829 F. Supp. 2d 
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as I have noted, the decision in McIntyre did nothing to allay that 
confusion. 
Not surprisingly, state courts have also struggled with the stream of 
commerce concept.  Some have adopted the stream of commerce plus 
test,154 sometimes leading to results that fly in the face of fundamental 
due process principles.155  Others have adopted the Brennan model.156 
Still others have declined to resolve the question altogether.157  In 
addition, various state courts have come up with their own unique 
formulations of the doctrine.  Here are a few examples of those 
variations with rising and falling levels of specificity and generality: 
It is sufficient that, as here, the defendant purposefully sets his product 
or his designs into the stream of commerce, knowing or having reason 
to know that they will reach the forum state and that they create a 
potential risk of injury.158  (Alaska Supreme Court) 
This court has decided that purposeful minimum contacts are 
established when an out-of-state manufacturer places its products in 
the stream of interstate commerce, because under those circumstances 
it is fair to charge the manufacturer with knowledge that its conduct 
might have consequences in another state.159  (Washington Supreme 
Court) 
[I]njuries were caused by products introduced into the stream of 
commerce by defendants whose primary interest was to benefit 
economically from their use in other states.  Correspondingly, the 
260, 269 (D. Del. 2010); Step2 Co., LLC v. Parallax Group Intern., LLC, No. 5:08CV2580, 2010 
WL 3783151, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2010). 
 154.  See, e.g., Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. 2010); State v. N. Atl. Ref. 
Ltd., 999 A.2d 396, 406 (N.H. 2010); CSR, Ltd. v. Taylor, 983 A.2d 492, 507 (Md. 2009). 
 155.  See, e.g., CSR, Ltd., 983 A.2d at 508 (For example, a Maryland court of appeals applied 
the O’Connor stream of commerce test and held that cargo “introduced into the stream of commerce 
with the expectation that it w[ill] arrive in th[e] forum” was sufficient to constitute purposeful 
availment to Maryland.  Hence, after granting foreign distributor’s petition for writ of certiorari, the 
court held that the foreign distributor’s act of shipping raw asbestos through port at which 
stevedores worked, did not constitute the requisite purposeful availment for a Maryland court to be 
able to exercise jurisdiction over the distributor). 
 156.  See, e.g., Ex parte DBI, Inc., 23 So. 3d 635, 647 (Ala. 2009); Kopke v. A. Hartrodt 
S.R.L., 629 N.W.2d 662, 674-65 (Wis. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1079 (2002). 
 157.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Edmondson v. Native Wholesale Supply, 237 P.3d 199, 207 (Okla. 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2150 (2011); Etchieson v. Cent. Purchasing, LLC, 232 P.3d 301, 307 
(Colo. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Grand River Enter., Inc., 757 N.W.2d 305, 313-15 (S.D. 2008); 
Ruckstuhl v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 731 So. 2d 881, 889 (La.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 
1019 (1999). 
 158.  Modern Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Traweek, 561 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Alaska 1977) (emphasis 
added). 
159.  Grange Ins. Ass’n v. State, 757 P.2d 933, 938 (Wash. 1988) (emphasis added). 
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forum states had an overriding interest in the protection of their 
citizens from injuries resulting from the use of these products.160  
(Hawai’i Supreme Court) 
In placing their goods in the flow of interstate commerce, the 
respondents must have had the reasonable expectation that such items 
would be shipped indiscriminately throughout the United States.  If 
dangerously defective goods are placed in the interstate flow of 
commerce, those whose negligence created the defect should be 
prepared to defend themselves wherever injury should occur.161  
(Idaho Supreme Court) 
The critical point here is that the stream of commerce test has no set 
meaning in federal or state courts and it has no apparent utility that could 
not be achieved more effectively by reference to the fundamental 
standards of due process (or by application of the effects test).  
Moreover, given its elasticity, it necessarily invites an arbitrary pattern 
of results that violate fundamental principles of due process. 
4. A Lesson from Tailored Long-Arm Statutes
Tailored long-arm statutes provide relatively detailed specifications 
of the circumstances under which a court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction.  As a consequence, one might think that the relatively 
precise guidance provided by such statutes would eliminate the never-
ending layering of doctrine upon doctrine caused by the case-by-case 
minimum contacts approach.  Yet this has not been so for three reasons. 
First, if jurisdiction is to be exercised, the application of a tailored long-
arm statute is merely a prelude to the application of due process, not a 
substitute.  Thus, any application of a long-arm statute must still be 
tested against the Due Process Clause.  Second, as noted above, in an 
effort to capture the fact-specific rulings of due process doctrine, states 
find themselves in a never-ending process of amending and interpreting 
their long-arm statutes.  Thus, case-by-case due process doctrine 
constantly invades the territory of the tailored long-arm statute and often 
end up distorting their wording and original rationales.  This is 
especially true in those states that do not interpret their tailored long-arm 
statutes as embracing the full extent of due process.162  Finally, the 
highly specified nature of a tailored long-arm statute operates much like 
160.  Kailieha v. Hayes, 536 P.2d 568, 572 (Haw. 1975) (emphasis added). 
161.  Doggett v. Elecs. Corp. of Am., 454 P.2d 63, 68–69 (Idaho 1969) (emphasis added). 
162.  These states are Georgia, Mississippi, New York, Ohio, Vermont, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin as well as the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
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fact-specific doctrine in that it deflects courts from a direct consideration 
of the fundamental due process principles at stake in the personal 
jurisdiction analysis, and instead focuses a court’s attention on the 
technicalities of the statutory specifications. 
The struggle to conform Georgia’s tailored long-arm statute to 
modern reality is instructive.163  Section 9-10-91(2) of the Georgia long-
arm statute provides Georgia courts the authority to exercise jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant who “[c]ommits a tortious act or omission 
within this State. . . .”  Georgia courts initially interpreted this statutory 
language as not covering tortious acts committed outside the state.164  In 
response, the legislature added subsection (3) to § 9-10-91, expressly 
vesting Georgia courts with the power to exercise jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant who caused an effect in the state by a tortious act 
or omission committed outside the state “if the tortfeasor regularly does 
or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, 
163.  The current Georgia long-arm statute provides: 
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident or his or her 
executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts, omissions, 
ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as if 
he or she were a resident of this state, if in person or through an agent, he or she: 
(1) Transacts any business within this state; 
(2) Commits a tortious act or omission within this state, except as to a cause of action for 
defamation of character arising from the act; 
(3) Commits a tortious injury in this state caused by an act or omission outside this state 
if the tortfeasor regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent 
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or 
services rendered in this state; 
(4) Owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within this state; or 
(5) With respect to proceedings for divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, or other 
domestic relations action or with respect to an independent action for support of 
dependents, maintains a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the 
commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the 
commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not, 
notwithstanding the subsequent departure of one of the original parties from this state 
and as to all obligations arising from alimony, child support, apportionment of debt, or 
real or personal property orders or agreements, if one party to the marital relationship 
continues to reside in this state.  This paragraph shall not change the residency 
requirement for filing an action for divorce. 
(6) Has been subject to the exercise of jurisdiction of a court of this state which has 
resulted in an order of alimony, child custody, child support, equitable apportionment of 
debt, or equitable division of property, notwithstanding the subsequent departure of one 
of the original parties from this state, if the action involves modification of such order 
and the moving party resides in this state, or if the action involves enforcement of such 
order notwithstanding the domicile of the moving party. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (West 2012). 
 164.  Castleberry v. Gold Agency, 185 S.E.2d 557 (1971); O’Neal Steel v. Smith, 169 S.E.2d 
827 (1969). 
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or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services 
rendered in this state.”165  In a case interpreting both sections, and 
despite the text of subsection (2), the Georgia Supreme Court, somewhat 
oddly, held that both subsections (2) and (3) permitted the exercise of 
jurisdiction over defendants who had committed tortious acts or 
omissions outside the state.166  The state high court later revisited that 
decision and returned to a “literal construction” of § 9-10-91, ruling that 
only subsection (3) permitted the exercise of jurisdiction when the 
tortious act occurred outside the state.167 
While interpreting subsections (2) and (3) of § 9-10-91, Georgia 
courts were also busy interpreting subdivision (1) of the same statute and 
held that that provision, which was triggered when a nonresident 
defendant transacted “any business within the state,” applied only in 
contract cases or where the nonresident defendant was physically present 
within the state.  The Georgia courts reached this conclusion even 
though the text of the statute did not literally impose either 
requirement.168 
This was the state of the law when the Georgia Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Innovative Clinical & Consulting Services, LLC v. 
First Nat. Bank of Ames,169 a case involving a combination of tort and 
contract claims premised largely on activities arising outside of the state, 
but having an adverse effect in the state.  The state court of appeals had 
held that jurisdiction could not be asserted over the tort claims under 
subsections (1), (2), or (3) of the state’s long-arm statute.170  The 
Georgia Supreme Court agreed that neither subsection (2) nor (3) was 
satisfied under the facts presented, but concluded that subsection (1)—
the transacting business section—could be used in tort cases since it 
vested Georgia courts with jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by 
due process of law.171 
The serpentine interpretation of the Georgia long-arm statute is 
instructive.172  A tailored long-arm statute operates in much the same 
165.  GA CODE ANN. § 9-10-91(3) (West 2014). 
166.  Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 195 S.E.2d 399, 400-01 (1973). 
167.  Gust v. Flint, 356 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1987). 
168.  See Innovative Clinical & Consulting Serv., LLC v. First Nat. Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 
353, 355 (Ga. 2005) (discussing this state of affairs). 
169.  Id. at 353. 
170.  Id. at 355. 
171.  Id. 
172.  In fact, we have described only the tip of iceberg of the interpretive complexities 
generated by Georgia’s long-arm statute.  See Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Shiv K. Kapoor, 
Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century: A Case Study 
Reconceptualizing the Typical Long-Arm Statute to Codify and Refine International Shoe After Its 
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fashion as judge-made doctrine.  The focus of the jurisdictional inquiry 
is deflected from the fundamentals of due process—connecting factors 
and reasonable expectations—and centers instead on the details of the 
text and on judicial interpretations and re-interpretations of that text.  
Instead of attending to fundamental principles, courts and litigants fight 
over the words, the gaps between words, and the inconsistencies that 
form within any body of interpretation.  Hence, while a tailored long-
arm statute may seem like a path to clarity, the opposite has often been 
true. 
We can observe these same patterns and interpretive stretches in 
other states that have not construed their long-arm statutes as going to 
the full extent of due process.  For example, in West Virginia, a 
commentary on the West Virginia’s long-arm statute expands the scope 
of the term “business” to include noncommercial activities: 
To assume that the legislature intended W.Va. Code § 56-3-33 to apply 
only to commercial activities of unincorporated businesses would be to 
apply an unduly limited meaning to that phrase.  The term “business” 
need not necessarily imply an activity tinged with commercial aspects; 
it is enough if the activity undertaken by the non-resident defendant is 
such that the non-resident can or should expect to derive a benefit 
therefrom.  The non-resident defendant’s activity must be purposeful 
but it need not be intimately intertwined with the defendant’s 
livelihood.173 
It is, however, hard to describe “business,” as an activity from which the 
nonresident defendant might gain only a moral or personal benefit.174  
Still, such noncommercial activity would seem to be covered by the 
West Virginia long-arm statute, as explained by the relevant 
commentary.175  However, in a way, all of this is beside the point, for 
whether a particular form of activity can be properly characterized as a 
“business” has no bearing on whether that activity represents a due-
process-sufficient connecting factor with the forum. 
First Sixty Years, 3 SETON HALL CIRCUIT. REV. 339 (2007). 
 173.  Harman v. Pauley, 522 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (D. W.V. 1981); see also 11B M.J. 
Jurisdiction § 15 (2011). 
 174.  However, see CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL 30 (Serenity Publishers 2008) 
(1843) (“Business!” cried the Ghost, wringing its hands again.  “Mankind was my business.  The 
common welfare was my business; charity, mercy, forbearance, and benevolence, were, all, my 
business.  The dealings of my trade were but a drop of water in the comprehensive ocean of my 
business!”) 
 175.  The courts of New York have also construed the “transacting business” component of the 
state’s long-arm statute as not being restricted to commercial activities.  Best Van Lines, Inc. v. 
Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 247 n.10 (2d Cir. 2007). 
37
Grossi: Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014
654 AKRON LAW REVIEW [47:617 
Similar interpretative questions arose in Kopke v. A. Hartrodt 
S.R.L.,176 where the Wisconsin Supreme Court confronted the text of its 
long-arm statute in the context of a products liability suit.  Kopke, a 
truck driver, was injured when he opened a cargo container in Neenah, 
Wisconsin.  The injury occurred when a pallet loaded with paper fell out 
of the container and landed on him.  L’Arciere, an employee-owned 
Italian cooperative, had loaded the pallet into the cargo container in 
Italy.  Kopke brought a personal injury claim against L’Arciere and 
others in a Wisconsin state court.  L’Arciere moved to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction.  The County Circuit Court denied this motion 
and ruled that L’Arciere’s acts of stabilizing the products being shipped 
by surrounding the product with air bags, and installing bracing beams 
and boards into the cargo container, brought the defendant within the 
scope of section 4(b) of state’s the long-arm statute and that the exercise 
of jurisdiction was consistent with due process.  L’Arciere’s appeal was 
eventually certified to the state Supreme Court.177 
The Wisconsin long-arm statute, § 801.05(4), authorized the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents whose act or 
omission committed outside of Wisconsin gives rise to an injury within 
the state under specified circumstances: 
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has 
jurisdiction over a person served in an action pursuant to § 801.11 
under any of the following circumstances: 
. . . 
(4) Local injury; foreign act.  In any action claiming injury to person or 
property within this state arising out of an act or omission outside this 
state by the defendant, provided in addition that at the time of the 
injury, either: 
. . . 
(b) Products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured 
by the defendant were used or consumed within this state in the 
ordinary course of trade.178 
The critical issue was whether L’Arciere had “processed” products, 
 176.  Kopke v. A. Hartrodt S.R.L., 629 N.W.2d 662 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1079 
(2002). 
177.  Id. at 667. 
 178.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(4) (West 2012) (emphasis added).  It is worth noting that also 
the Wisconsin long-arm statute treats the stream-of-commerce as an expression of the effect-test. 
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materials, or things that were used or consumed within Wisconsin.179  As 
the State Supreme Court phrased it, “The question presented is, 
therefore, whether the word ‘process’ means to bring about a physical 
transformation upon the products, materials, or things themselves, as 
urged by L’Arciere . . . or whether process is a broader term,” i.e., one 
that would include the preparation of goods for transit.180  In concluding 
that the latter, more inclusive definition was more consistent with the 
goals of the long-arm statute, the state high court relied on an earlier 
decision by the Seventh Circuit, Nelson by Carson v. Park Industries, 
Inc.,181 construing § 801.05(4)(b): 
The verb “to process” certainly may refer to the narrower concept of 
preparing something in the sense of manufacturing it.  However, it also 
has the broader definitions of subjecting something to a particular 
system of handling to effect a particular result and preparing 
something for market or other commercial use by subjecting it to a 
process.  See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the 
English Language (1963).182 
With that broad interpretation as its guide, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
concluded that the loading activities engaged in by L’Arciere fell within 
the scope of § 801.05(4)(b) as a form of processing.183  In so ruling the 
court rejected the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit construing a virtually 
identical Florida statute as pertaining only to the process of 
manufacturing and thus excluded activities pertaining to the shipment of 
the goods.184  The Wisconsin court explained the differing conclusions 
as being the product of different interpretive principles.185  The court 
also found that the exercise of jurisdiction over L’Arciere was consistent 
with due process, applying Justice Brennan’s pure stream of commerce 
model.186 
Given the broad interpretation employed by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, the Wisconsin long-arm statute did not prevent the court from 
examining the fundamentals of due process (albeit through the 
misdirected lens of the stream of commerce test).  The result in the Fifth 
179.  Kopke, 629 N.W.2d at 668. 
180.  Id. at 669. 
181.  See generally Nelson by Carson v. Park Indus. Inc., 717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1983). 
182.  Id. at 1124 n.5. 
183.  Kopke, 629 N.W.2d at 670. 
184.  See generally Mallard v. Aluminum Co. of Canada, 634 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1981). 
185.  Kopke, 629 N.W.2d at 671. 
186.  Id. at 674-75. 
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Circuit case was, however, quite different.187  The Fifth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the statute blocked any consideration of fundamental 
due process principles.  On the one hand, the interpretation adopted by 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court seems to be a bit of a stretch.  On the 
other hand, it seems unlikely that the Florida legislature intended to draw 
the manufacturer-shipper distinction that the language of the statute 
suggests.  The simple point is this: Whether the “product, material, or 
things” were “processed,” has virtually nothing to do with connecting 
factors, expectations, or fundamental principles of fairness and justice, 
which should have instead engaged the court. 
III. PROPOSAL: A FUNDAMENTAL-PRINCIPLES DUE PROCESS STATUTE
With a broader perspective of the subject, this Article posits that a
legislative intervention—at both the state and federal levels—would 
better address the topic and significantly reduce current inconsistencies 
and confusion, than continuing to rely upon an increasingly disjointed 
case-by-case approach.  Indeed, immediately after International Shoe, 
state and federal legislative bodies might have stepped in and adopted 
statutes that articulated the basic ideas contained in that opinion, thus 
offering a stable, principled approach to answering many of the issues 
that the Court had to later confront on a case-by-case basis, not always 
successfully, as the Court itself recently admitted.188 
As I noted in the introduction, all statutes are subject to judicial 
interpretation and judicial review.  Hence, the Supreme Court will have 
the final say as to the constitutionally permissible scope of any proposed 
statute.  It is possible that the Court will insist on enforcing its doctrinal 
approach to personal jurisdiction but it is also possible that the guidance 
from the statute will assist the Court in redirecting its analysis back to 
the fundamental principles of due process. 
My statute takes a middle course between an open-ended due 
process type statute and the typical tailored long-arm statute.  I reject the 
due process type because it provides too little guidance and it would 
generate the same problems that the Supreme Court has created in 
interpreting the Due Process Clause.  I also reject the tailored long-arm 
statute for the reasons offered in Part III.B.4.  This is because tailored 
 187.  See Mallard, 634 F.2d at 241 (explaining that the statutory language could not be read to 
give the court jurisdiction in this case). 
 188.  “This Court’s Asahi decision may be responsible in part for that court’s error regarding 
the stream of commerce, and this case presents an opportunity to provide greater clarity.”  J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011). 
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long-arm statutes incorporate the misguided case-by-case doctrine of due 
process and therefore are not premised on a durable standard capable of 
application to a wide range of cases.  My statute is intended to articulate 
precisely such a durable standard without the baggage of the Court’s 
mechanistic formulas or the acrobatics that state courts exercise in 
interpreting their long-arm statutes. 
A. Proposed Statute 
My proposed statute, which is addressed to Congress and state 
legislatures,189 reads as follows: 
Section 1.  The district courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over 
an individual or entity not a resident of the state in which the court is 
located when the individual or entity has engaged in activities in that 
state or outside that state that have caused effects therein, when those 
in-state activities or in-state effects are such as to give that individual 
or entity a reasonable expectation of being sued in that state.  A 
“reasonable expectation of being sued in the forum” shall take account 
of both the quality and quantity of the contacts, including the 
relationship or lack thereof between those contacts and the plaintiff’s 
claims. 
Section 2.  The district courts may not decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction provided under Section 1 of this Title unless authorized to 
do so by Congress. 
B. Commentary to the Proposed Statute 
1. Section 1
This section is premised on the due process principles of connecting 
factors and reasonable expectations arising from those connections.  This 
standard does not draw any distinction between the traditional and 
minimum contacts bases of jurisdiction.  Nor does it draw a distinction 
between general and specific jurisdiction; nor among the various 
subcategories of doctrine developed over the past several decades, e.g., 
purposeful availment, effect test, stream of commerce, etc.  Rather, this 
Section asks a simple and direct question and, at the same time, 
encompasses a wide range of jurisdictional possibilities, all traceable to 
the fundamental principles of due process. 
 189.  The text of the statute is directed toward its application in the federal judicial system.  
The text, however, could be easily revised to make it applicable in state courts.  
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As discussed herein, most of the Supreme Court’s major decisions 
on personal jurisdiction could be resolved and explained by reference to 
this elegant standard.  For example, the activities of the International 
Shoe Company in the State of Washington were of such a nature to give 
that company reasonable expectation of a suit in the forum based on 
those contacts.  Similarly, the contractual relationships in McGee and 
Burger King were sufficiently connected to the forum state to give the 
parties to the contracts a reasonable expectation of suit in the forum on 
claims arising from those contacts.  Even the decision in Calder can be 
explained as premised on the nonresident defendants’ connections with 
the forum state, such connections giving rise to a reasonable expectation 
of suit in the forum.  The Section 1 standard also explains the denial of 
jurisdiction in World Wide Volkswagen and Shaffer, where the absence 
of meaningful factors connecting the nonresident defendants with the 
forum indicated the absence of a reasonable expectation of suit against 
them in that forum.190  Section 1 would eliminate tag jurisdiction.191  It 
would not overrule Burnham, but it would eliminate a district court’s 
authority to exercise the jurisdiction otherwise permitted by Burnham. 
Undoubtedly, there is some tension between this standard and some 
of the Court’s decisions, at least if those decisions are examined under 
the Fourteenth Amendment perspective.  This might occur in a federal 
forum under the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
4(k)(1)(A), or in a state forum that has adopted my proposed statute.  
Certainly, the results in Hanson, Kulko, and McIntyre can be seen as 
inconsistent with the standard described in Section 1.  This is because in 
those cases the Court insinuated an artificial test between the 
fundamental principle and the facts.  Thus, in these cases, the personal 
jurisdiction analysis was driven by irrelevant questions.  Of course, it is 
possible that the current Court would insist on a continuation of this 
practice, thus rendering Section 1 ineffective and potentially 
unconstitutional.  But it is also possible that the Court would accept an 
invitation from Congress to reconsider its personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence from the more principled perspective provided in Section 
1. 
With respect to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by federal 
courts, the Fourteenth Amendment constitutional issue should disappear, 
since the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts is constrained by the 
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.  In other words, the exercise 
190.  See supra text accompanying notes 40-41. 
191.  See supra text accompanying notes 42-46. 
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of personal jurisdiction here would not present a question of jurisdiction 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A), which incorporates 
the Fourteenth Amendment, but would under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(k)(1)(C), which vests federal courts with personal 
jurisdiction pursuant to a congressionally enacted statute.  Under these 
circumstances, the constitutionality of any application of Section 1 
would look at the connecting factors between the nonresident defendant 
and the United States as a whole. 
Given the foregoing, it is quite likely that under the proposed 
statute a federal court would be able to exercise personal jurisdiction in 
cases presenting fact-patterns similar to those in Hanson, Kulko, and 
McIntyre.  In McIntyre, for example, the foreign manufacturer clearly 
had contacts with the United States as a whole, since it targeted the 
entire North American market, and those contacts were certainly 
sufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of suit in the United 
States premised on effects of that marketing felt there.  Under Section 1, 
Justice Ginsburg’s analysis in McIntyre would be unassailable, since the 
standard would be, in fact, national contacts as a matter of the Fifth 
Amendment due process clause. 
Although Section 1 does not expressly reference the traditional 
grounds of jurisdiction, as I have explained, most of them are 
encompassed by its standard.192  For example, an individual who is 
domiciled in the state in which the court is located will be subject to the 
jurisdiction in that state since domicile in a state creates a reasonable 
expectation of suit there, given both the quality and quantity of the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum.  In other words, domicile is a 
meaningful contact that gives the defendant a reasonable expectation of 
suit in the forum.193  Similarly, consent to jurisdiction in a forum 
inherently creates a connection with the forum that leads to reasonable 
expectation of suit there. 
2. Section 2
The purpose of Section 2 is to replace the “unreasonableness” exit 
of the personal jurisdiction analysis with a legislatively defined and 
carefully circumscribed forum non conveniens doctrine.194  I have 
 192.  See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 29 & cmt. a (2012) (domicile); id. § 41 & cmts. a & b (place of 
incorporation); id. § 32 (consent); id. § 33 (waiver or appearance). 
 193.  See Simona Grossi, Rethinking the Harmonization of Jurisdictional Rules, 86 TUL. L. 
REV. 623 (2012). 
194.  See supra text accompanying notes 31-39. 
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proposed the adoption of precisely such a forum non conveniens 
statute.195  That statute is essentially a companion to my proposed 
personal jurisdiction statute.  The combined goal of these proposed 
statutes is to define the scope of personal jurisdiction and to provide 
guidance as to the limited circumstances under which a court may 
decline the exercise of an otherwise legitimate exercise of jurisdiction. 
***** 
The above proposed personal jurisdiction statute fully incorporates 
the fundamental principles of due process recognized by the Court in 
International Shoe.  It also embraces the traditional grounds of 
jurisdiction, but only to the extent that those traditional grounds are 
consistent with International Shoe’s individual-rights conception of the 
due process of law.  Moreover, its application requires no mechanistic 
formulas, nor any doctrinal tests other than those that focus on the 
 195.  See Simona Grossi, Forum Non Conveniens as a Jurisdictional Doctrine, 75 U. PITT. L. 
REV. ___ (2014).  The proposed forum non conveniens statute reads as follows: 
1. In any civil action of which a district court has original jurisdiction, the district court
may stay or dismiss the action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens only if: 
a. The defendant files a timely motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conven-
iens, such timeliness to be measured under the standards applicable to a motion un-
der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), but for good cause shown, the court 
may extend the period set forth in this Section for the filing a (sic) forum non con-
veniens motions: and 
b. The moving party demonstrates and the district court finds that there is an avail-
able alternate forum with jurisdiction over the action and the defendants, that, as a 
practical matter, the plaintiff will have access to that forum, that such forum pro-
vides a suitable substantive remedy for the claim or claims asserted by the plaintiff, 
and that such forum adheres to the fundamental standards of due process; and 
c. The district court finds that the available alternate forum provides a substantially
more suitable forum for the adjudication of the claim or action, and that the 
maintenance of the claim or action in the district court would impose substantial in-
justice on the moving party. 
2. For good cause shown, the court may extend the period set forth in Section 1a for the
filing a forum non conveniens motion. 
3. If the district court finds that the standards in Section 1 have been satisfied, it may stay
or dismiss the claim or action on any condition it deems just.  Such conditions may in-
clude the defendant’s waiver of any statute of limitation or lack of jurisdiction defense 
he might otherwise have in the alternate forum. 
4. When granting a motion to dismiss an action on forum non conveniens grounds, the
district court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce its dismissal order and any related stipu-
lations or conditions attached thereto. 
5. A court that grants or denies a motion to stay or dismiss an action pursuant to this
statute shall set forth specific findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the 
court’s order.  
6. An order granting or denying a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds is
immediately appealable.  The findings of fact shall be reviewed under a clearly errone-
ous standard.  The conclusions of law shall be reviewed under de novo standard. 
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forum-relating connecting factors and the reasonable expectations that 
make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable. 
While courts will be required to apply this statute in specific factual 
contexts, those applications should not operate as an invitation to create 
new doctrine or rewrite the statute, as has occurred with so many state 
long-arm statutes.  Rather, those applications should provide no more 
than exemplars of what a particular court did under a particular set of 
facts, consistent with the specific language of the statute.  To be sure, the 
perceived wisdom of those particular applications may well influence 
the direction of statutory interpretation, but the critical question must 
always be whether the application respects the fundamental principles of 
due process. 
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1966, von Mehren and Trautman had identified problems with 
the then emerging personal jurisdiction formula that became even more 
evident in the years that followed.196  At that time, they predicted that 
significant changes were going to occur and that, among those changes, 
a less mechanistic and more effective methodology would emerge.197  
Instead, under the guidance of the Supreme Court, quite the opposite has 
occurred. 
The importance of personal jurisdiction cannot be overstated.  As 
noted earlier, personal jurisdiction is deeply intertwined with the 
litigants’ due process rights.  Also, the outcome of cases is significantly 
influenced, if not entirely determined, by decisions on jurisdiction and 
choice of law, with the latter often deeply influenced by the former. 
Those who are skeptical of rules might raise questions as to 
whether a statute would really solve the issues that the Court’s standards 
have thus far not been able to solve.  Indeed, even after a statute is 
passed, judges would still be the ones who interpret and apply it.  The 
proposed statute and its underlying ideas and principles, however, would 
not generate the same problems that the current personal jurisdiction 
judge-made formula is generating because it will carefully guide judges 
through a crisp analysis.  Indeed, by endorsing the clear and 
straightforward formula of connecting factors and the reasonable 
expectations to which those factors can give rise, the proposed statute 
reminds courts that the jurisdictional inquiry is a fact-specific analysis 
 196.  See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A 
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966). 
197.  Id. 
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and that no more specific doctrinal test is needed to decide when 
meaningful connections with the forum state give rise to a reasonable 
expectation of being sued there.  True, judges might view facts 
differently.  However, the basic idea is that for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction to be consistent with due process, it should be reasonably 
expected by the defendant based on his or her meaningful contacts with 
the forum.  At least that is the right question to ask. 
The proposed personal jurisdiction statute would not be the first 
jurisdictional statute to provide clear and effective guidance to federal 
courts.  Indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 governing supplemental jurisdiction 
can be considered illustrative in this respect.  When § 1367 was adopted, 
in 1990, courts were confused as to when they could properly exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction, for the Court’s earlier opinions198 had left 
some questions unanswered.199  Congress decided to intervene by 
passing § 1367.  Subsections (a) and (c) of that statute adopt a 
fundamental principles approach to supplemental jurisdiction that, 
through general formula—”claims that are so related . . . that they form 
part of the same case or controversy under Article III”—and general 
criteria that a court might consider to “decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction”—gives courts sufficient guidance as to the scope of the 
standards, avoiding the need for further doctrinal developments.200  The 
guidance that the statute offered under subsections (a) and (c) was 
indeed effective, for the Court has not had to revisit the related issues 
again.  On the other hand, the Court’s intervention was necessary to 
clarify the scope of subsection (b) of the same statute,201 which, unlike 
the other two provisions, had been framed in the tailored-long-arm-
statute style.  Learning from that experience, the proposed personal 
jurisdiction statute mirrors the format of subsections (a) and (c) of the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute and as a result provides a durable 
standard capable of application across a wide range of cases. 
 198.  See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Owen Equipment & Erection 
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). 
199.  Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1976). 
200.  28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a) & (c) (1990). 
201.  See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005). 
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